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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, energy security is a growing concern in the state foreign policy. The interdependency in the 
energy field is a very important dimension of the contemporary relations between states and transnational 
corporations. The Central Asia region is not only the undiscovered reservoir of oil and gas, but also the 
strategic “chessboard” with many internal and external players, where the new great game started after 
the Cold War. Kazakhstan, because of the geopolitical position in the center of Eurasia, and as one of the 
biggest producer of energy resources, is becoming significant in the international energy market. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, it became open to foreign investments. The growing energy needs have given 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) a strong interest in developing ties with energy-producing states in 
the Central Asia region to build necessary pipeline infrastructure [Kandiyoti 2008]. Kazakhstan is getting 
increasing importance in this context. Kazakhstan and all Central Asia region seems the most likely to play 
an important role in the Chinese strategy to reduce its dependence on energy supplies from the Middle East.
Key words: Kazakhstan, China’s energy policy, energy security, pipelines
INTRODUCTION
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to a significant 
change in the configuration of Eurasian geopolitics [McCarthy 2000]. Such a reality 
created the Central Asia region as an area of influence by neighboring states and 
distant players [Iseri 2009]. Thus, some analysts describe the rivalry in the region as 
a great game among the main actors: the United States, the European Union, China 
and Russia. Zbigniew Brzeziński [1998] defines Central Asia region as the “Eurasian 
Balkans”, including the following nine countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadzhi-
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kistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Afghanistan. 
According to him, this space is a “power vacuum”, in which the external political 
interference is decisive [Penerliev 2012: 4]. Surrounded by Russia, China, and South 
Asian states, the Central Asian countries are the “geopolitical highlight of Eurasia, 
making them both a buffer and a passageway between East and West” (see: Map 1) 
[Rywkin 2005]. Central Asia is a significant energy and natural resources producer, 
with the capacity to reduce the world’s heavy dependence on Middle Eastern hydro-
carbons [Mantel 2016: 139–150]. The region’s political and economic development 
has been a model of an effective transformation after the Soviet system [Ghafouri 
2008: 81]. This would provide Kazakhstan with increased energy security in the 
“complex interdependencies and geopolitics of the Central Asian Energy Game” 
[Garrison, Abdurahmanov 2011: 381–405]. 
Map 1. The Central Asia region
Source: Penerliev [2012: 176].
The article discusses the issue of the cooperation between China and Kazakhstan 
in energy field. In this paper, it is important to verify some hypothesis. First of all, 
the energy security is vital to economic development both for the People’s Republic 
of China and Kazakhstan. Second of all, China, as a rapidly expanding economy, 
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and the largest energy consumer in the world, has given the Kazakhstan increasing 
economical importance. China’s interests in Kazakhstan, as a Caspian littoral state, 
are part of its overall Silk Road strategy to diversify energy dependence on the 
unstable Gulf region and build overland routes to hedge against maritime supply 
disruptions from the Gulf. To prove the above-mentioned hypothesis, we will ana-
lyze the Chinese and Kazakh energy security strategy and the energy potential data 
of Kazakhstan as the main Caspian energy producer. We will also analyze the main 
field of cooperation between both states: the pipeline infrastructure.
In this research, it is useful to take into consideration the Copenhagen school of 
international relations (Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI). We should 
spill security issues over into other sectors, which are fundamentally different from 
military ones [Buzan,  Wæver, de Wilde 1998: 195]. Security is an idea which needs 
a dialog between and within states, civilizations and other actors on the international 
scene. Security, being a dynamic process, became a complex, multidimensional 
phenomenon. Its multidimensionality means that it is regarding many areas of the 
international relations with the access to the energy and its consumption as well 
[Pietraś 2017: 23–40]. Since the energy security became one of dimensions of se-
curity sectors, its specificity is becoming a research problem [Pietraś 2017: 23–40].
In the structure of this paper, we included the energy security strategy of the PRC 
and Kazakhstan and the pipeline infrastructure which connects both states. As far as 
the research strategy, in our analyses, we use the case study method, and concentrated 
on the two states: Kazakhstan and China. These are important economic partners: 
Kazakhstan is the energy producer, and China is the energy importer. The research 
field of this paper is not very popular in Polish literature, so we can safely assume 
that it could fill the gap in this context. 
ENERGY SECURITY POLICY OF ThE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ChINA1
China’s rise as a global power is likely to be the most significant event in in-
ternational relations in the 21st century. China is rapidly emerging as a major force 
in both world energy markets and global energy geopolitics. Especially in the past 
several years, when its economy has developed rapidly and it needs much more 
energy than ever before [Xiaoqin 2012: 33]. China recorded the largest increase in 
consumption of oil and gas worldwide. In 2010, it surpassed the United States as the 
world’s largest energy consumer [Fredholm 2011]. Thus, with continued growth in 
consumption, China is looking for new energy sources and routes of transportation 
of hydrocarbons [Georgescu, Munteanu, Garayev 2013: 295]. It has a great and 
growing need for additional energy imports.
1  See more in: Misiągiewicz [2013: 151–166].
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The 21st century is deemed a “period of strategic opportunities in peaceful de-
velopment of China” [Xiaoqin 2012: 34]. It was a time of industrialization and 
urbanization. Since then, the priority strategy of China was creating energy coope-
ration with neighboring countries in order to establish a stable and reliable energy 
supply infrastructure. China has developed comprehensive bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation with Central Asia states. It appears to have three main goals in Central 
Asia: to provide security to the region, to gain access to natural resources, and to 
become a regional power. 
China enjoyed adequate domestic reserves to satisfy energy needs prior to the 1990s 
[Demir 2010: 522]. It exported oil and coal until the early 1990s, when the booming 
economy inspired by Deng Xiaoping’s reforms transformed this country into an energy 
importer [howell 2009: 191] (see: Table 1, 2). There are two key reasons for its increased 
energy consumption: the rise in living standards and increased industrialization (see: 
Diagram 1). however, the real energy security problem is providing adequate amounts 
of crude oil and natural gas [Demir 2010: 522]. Current oil import dependency at over 
50%, causes alarm in China [howell 2009: 191]. The PRC also continues to increase 
its natural gas power generation capacity. It started a program in the 1990s to ship gas 
across the country and to build natural gas terminals to import it from overseas. Like 
other consuming states, China is concerned about maintaining “the reliable and affordable 
supply of energy on a continuing, uninterrupted basis” [Klare 2008: 485]. 
Another important energy security strategy issue is to concentrate on maximizing 
the development of domestic sources and creating strategic reserves. As a result, 
Chinese policymakers have to create an investment climate in order to get maximum 
profit from existing domestic resources and establish reliable oil and gas trading 







EU PRC US Asia Russia Middle 
East
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Diagram 1. World’s energy consumption
Source: Author’s own study based on https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/pocketbook_energy-2016_
web-final_final.pdf (access: 12.04.2017).
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Nowadays, China is regarded as one of the major players shaping the global 
economy. Energy consumption in China grew by 1.3% in 2016. Growth during 
2015 and 2016 was the lowest over a two-year period since 1997–1998. Despite 
this, China remained the world’s largest growth market for energy (see: Diagram 2, 
3, 4, 5). The PRC has experienced oil and gas demand growth that has accounted 
for nearly one third of the world’s total oil demand growth during the past decade. 
Thus, the security of energy supplies is a principal issue for Chinese policymakers. 
Diagram 2. China – natural gas consumption
Source: https://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=136&c=aj&l=en (access: 11.01.19).
Diagram 3. China – natural gas imports
Source: https://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=136&c=aj&l=en (access: 11.01.19).
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Diagram 4. China – oil consumption
Source: https://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=136&c=aj&l=en (access: 11.01.19).
Diagram 5. China – oil imports
Source: https://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=136&c=aj&l=en (access: 11.01.19).
Table 1. China’s crude oil imports by source (end of 2014)
Kazakhstan Saudi 
Arabia
Angola Russia Oman Iraq Iran Venezuela UAE Kuwait Columbia
2% 16% 13% 11% 10% 9% 9% 4% 4% 3% 3%
Source: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/The-Battle-For-Chinas-Oil-Market.html (access: 12.04.2017).
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Table 2. Chinese natural gas import main sources (end of 2014)
Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Qatar Australia Indonesia Malaysia Kazakhstan




According to Sabrina howell, there are some vulnerabilities of Chinese energy 
policy:
– China is located far from its petroleum suppliers;
– it suffers from a poor geologic endowment;
– demand is increasing faster than supply;
– the Chinese Communist Party is committed to continued improvements in 
the Chinese standard of living, which is necessary to the regime’s survival [howell 
2009: 192].
China’s energy strategy evolved along with continuous reform of the state insti-
tutions responsible for its formulation and implementation. China is one of the few 
countries in the world without a government-level body in charge of all energy sectors 
and coordination of state’s energy development [Nechaeva, Li 2017: 185–200]. Due 
to the growing energy deficit, a specialized energy bureau affiliated to the National 
Development and Reform Commission was created in 2003 and supposedly acted 
as an integrating organ responsible for strategy of energy development of the PRC 
[Nechaeva, Li 2017: 185–200].
The first Chinese energy policy document using the term “energy security” was 
Twenty-First Century Oil Strategy, published in 2003 [howell 2009: 193]. It was 
a part of the 2004 State Council report National Energy Strategy and Policy and 
the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) [howell 2009: 193]. Several elements of the 
Tenth Five-Year Plan underlined the importance of China’s energy strategy for its 
overall economic development:
– diversification of energy supplies;
– to enhance overseas energy investments by state oil companies;
– to increase investments in energy infrastructure;
– established state-controlled strategic petroleum reserves;
– to reduce dependence on oil by using coal and nuclear power;
– to establish a regional energy-security system [hall, Grant 2009: 125].
The Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) called for reducing the energy in-
tensity of GDP by 20% [The 11th Five-Year Plan]. The Twelfth Five-Year Plan 
(2011–2015) adopted in March 2011 devoted considerable attention to energy and 
climate change. The implementation of the Plan will require considerable reduction 
of the share of coal in the China’s economy. The share of natural gas would double 
and the new sources of energy would also increase their share [Energy will be the 
basis of the 12th five-year plan of China 2010].
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Given the current needs of the country, China’s leaders set the following tasks 
for energy policy: 1) increase volumes of imported energy, 2) access foreign markets 
and oil deposits through investments in exploration, exploitation and processing of 
foreign energy resources (“going out” strategy), 3) diversify supply routes, 4) diver-
sify supply sources, 5) participate in multilateral energy forums in order to stabilize 
global oil prices at the level which is acceptable to China [Jun 2010].
Analyzing the Chinese energy policy, we have to mention about the idea of  the 
“One Belt, One Road” (OBOR). It can be called a comprehensive domestic and for-
eign policy concept. The economic belt would serve this purpose for China’s western 
and inland central Asian states. It is also the political framework for the economic 
and energy cooperation between China and its western neighbors [Wacker 2014].
Oil and gas sector has been dominated by three major state-run companies: they 
are China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec). 
Chinese government directed its oil companies to acquire interests abroad [hall, 
Grant 2009: 124]. Chinese oil companies, especially the China National Petroleum 
Company, have been involved in energy projects in more than 20 countries [Demir 
2010: 524]. 
ENERGY SECURITY POLICY OF KAZAKhSTAN
Kazakhstan is rich in hydrocarbon resources and is one of the largest energy 
producers in Central Asia (see: Table 3). It has the largest hydrocarbon, uranium, 
chromium, lead, zinc, manganese and copper reserves in the Caspian basin and 
Central Asia, and ranks in the top ten for coal, iron, and gold reserves in the world 
[Assanbayev 2016: 127–138]. Of these resources, oil and gas constitute the backbone 
of the national economy. The country is ranked 8th highest in the world with regard 
to crude oil resources and 12th highest with regard to crude oil reserves. Natural gas 
reserves are 18th highest in the world. 





































Kazakhstan 30.0 1.8% 1,672 1.8% 1.1 0.6% 27.1 0.7% 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2018, https://www.bp.com (access: 12.12.2018).
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Kazakhstan exported about 1.69 million barrels of oil per day in 2014 [Badykov 
2015]. In 2015, it exported 60.9 million tons of oil, which comprised 76.7% of the 
total amount produced in the country [Mantel 2016: 139–150]. Oil revenues make 
up the biggest share of state’s budget. Until 2015, oil revenues accounted for 60% 
of Kazakhstan’s budget, and 33% of GDP [Vidyanova 2016]. Energy production is 
crucial for the state’s economic development, which relies heavily on the growing 
energy exports. In this regard, it is important to “identify the main strategy for energy 
security and sustainable energy development in the long term, in order to reduce the 
country’s dependence on non-renewable energy resources and, consequently, improve 
economic sustainability and environmental conditions” [Mantel 2016: 139–150].
Kazakhstan has three refineries, at Pavlodar, Atyrau, and Shymkent, but still 
must import oil products (diesel fuel) for its own needs from Russia [Babak 2006: 
50–51]. In contrast to the upstream sector, the refining sector remained largely in the 
possession of the state [Babak 2006: 50–51]. State regulatory policy means domestic 
pricing system and existing export duties on oil products. Domestic prices for refined 
products remained low, “offering little incentive to produce refined products for the 
domestic market” [Babak 2006: 50–51]. The total capacity of all three oil refineries 
in Kazakhstan remains limited, because foreign oil companies prefer to export crude 
oil rather than to sell the oil within the state at low domestic prices. Besides, the 
refineries are old and need more investments (Atyrau refinery, for instance, was built 
at the end of the Second World War) [Babak 2006: 50–51].
Kazakhstan comprised the strategic petroleum reservoir of the Soviet Union 
economy [Mantel 2016: 139–150]. Although discovered in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
large hydrocarbon deposits of the Caspian region remained practically unexplored 
until the mid-1990s. The giant Tengiz oil field was the exception, because the ex-
ploration there began in the late 1980s [Mantel 2016: 139–150]. It remains one of 
the five leading Kazakhstan’s offshore fields – Karachaganak [Assanbayev 2016], 
Mangistau, Uzen and Aktau – with estimated reserves of 750 million to 1.1 billion 
tons of recoverable oil [Kazakhstan to Continue… 2015] (see: Table 4).
Table 4. Main Kazakhstan oil fields potentials








Source: hall and Grant [2009: 66].
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With regard to the crucial role of the energy sector in Kazakhstan’s economic 
development, the state is determined to develop this potential by improving coo-
peration with Western partners. This process began following the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union [Mantel 2016: 139–150]. Together with other Central Asian coun-
tries, Kazakhstan has managed to overcome a difficult transition, from part of the 
Soviet system to an “independent state with a rapidly developing market economy 
open to cooperation and global partnerships” [Mantel 2016: 139–150]. At present, 
Kazakhstan’s geo-economic profile mainly focuses on the development of its energy 
resources.
There is an important role of the transnational companies in developing the 
Kazakhstan energy fields. The American Chevron Texaco company together with 
ExxonMobil, agreed to develop the Tengiz oil field [Newman 2008: 96]. The Euro-
pean oil giants, such as Agip/Eni, Shell Development B.V., British Petroleum, and 
Total Fina Elf, are collaborating on prospective projects such as the development 
of the Karachaganak and Kashagan fields [Cohen 2008: 13]. Kazakhstan’s limited 
access to sea ports increases its dependence on pipelines, which are necessary to 
transport its hydrocarbons to the global energy markets. The state also serves as 
a transit corridor for pipeline exports from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Nowadays, 
the pipeline infrastructure explains the fact that Kazakhstan’s neighbors – China and 
Russia – are key economic partners, providing sources of demand and financing 
[Mantel 2016: 139–150]. 
Although Kazakhstan’s growth as an important player in the global energy market 
helps drive its economic and political development, the process also entails problema-
tic consequences and challenges [Mantel 2016: 139–150]. One of those is “pollution 
and the challenge of transforming its energy sector into an environmentally-friendly 
and sustainable one. The country’s energy-related carbon emissions have been consi-
derable in the last years” [Mantel 2016: 139–150]. Another problem that Kazakhstan 
will face in the coming decades is the “gradual drain of resources and degradation 
of equipment” [Mantel 2016: 139–150]. It can lead to the energy imbalance and an 
energy crisis which, in turn, could limit oil and gas exports revenues. This issue is 
associated with the “deficiency of capacity, lack of energy independence, and dec-
lining financial resources” [Mantel 2016: 139–150].
The Republic of Kazakhstan is rich in hydrocarbon resources, as well as in re-
newable sources (RES). An increase of the electricity expenditure, the growing need 
to overcome urgent environmental problems and to enhance energy security, have 
contributed to concerns and interest in expanding alternative energy use.
The leaders of Kazakhstan, realizing the strategic importance of the country’s 
oil and gas abundance for the world economy, are taking advantage of the energy 
factor in pursuing foreign policy to strengthen the position of Kazakhstan in the 
world. Energy security is one of the political and economic priorities of Kazakhstan 
[Baizakova 2010: 103–109]. One of the most important documents of Kazakhstan’s 
energy policy is the 2050 Development Strategy (“2050 Strategy”), announced on 
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December 15, 2012 by President Nursultan Nazarbayev [Mantel 2016: 139–150]. 
Kazakhstan’s energy strategy is based on the principle of cost effectiveness and the 
energy industry’s development with a minimum impact on the environment. The 
strategy calls for “far-reaching economic, social and political reforms, necessary to 
advance the country into the 30 most developed global economies by 2050. In this 
regard, energy security is one of the most important sectors” [Mantel 2016: 139–150]. 
The RES are described as highly efficient in the Kazakhstan 2050 Development 
Strategy. “Energy security requires urgent action, as the region’s consumption of 
resources is disproportionate to production” [Mantel 2016: 139–150]. These poli-
cies, adopted with governmental support, will “help reduce dependence on fossil 
resources, increase the RES use and further development, and, consequently, raise 
the country’s energy security to a completely new and more efficient level” [Mantel 
2016: 139–150]. Kazakhstan has all the necessary conditions for renewable energy. 
It has the wind potential of more than 1 trillion kWh per year – one of the best in the 
world, strong hydropower potential, sunny climate and favorable wind conditions 
for a wide use of non fossil energy [Mantel 2016: 139–150]. There are rich RES in 
the southeast of Kazakhstan, which are located far from hydrocarbon energy sour-
ces, such as coal, oil and gas. Potentially, environmentally-friendly energy sources 
of southern Kazakhstan “could not only sustain the domestic market, but also be 
exported to neighboring countries, such as China, which is experiencing growing 
demand for electrical energy” [Kazakhstan 2050 Renewable… 2016]. 
Europe and China are the main consumers of Kazakhstan’s crude oil. That is why, 
transport diversification issues are particularly sensitive for Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s 
energy policy aims to “promote the construction and distribution of new oil and 
gas pipelines directly to European and Chinese markets, either through Russia or 
bypassing it” [Assanbayev 2016: 127–138]. In terms of transportation infrastructure 
system, Kazakhstan is concentrated on ensuring reliable energy supplies to Europe, 
Turkey and China in cooperation with other energy producing and transit states. 
however, Kazakhstan’s geographical isolation from world energy markets and the 
emerging divide between the United States and Russia in regard to transportation 
communications and geopolitics began at the end of 1990s, has been the main ob-
stacle to the realization of its energy strategy [Assanbayev 2016: 127–138]. Russian 
policy in Kazakhstan has been led by four major energy companies: Gazprom, 
Lukoil, Transneft, and Rosneft, which allow Moscow to increase influence over the 
energy sector of Kazakhstan, and prevent the PRC and other powers from dominating 
Kazakhstan’s energy. 
A key element in Kazakhstan’s energy policy in terms of oil exports is the deve-
lopment of its onshore Tengiz and Karachaganak oil fields and the operation of the 
Kashagan offshore field in the Caspian Sea. But while Tengiz and Karachaganak are 
already operating, Kashagan has become the most expensive and complicated oil 
field development project. On October 14, 2016, the oil production in Kashagan was 
finally launched. This was promising news in terms of increasing energy revenues 
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“amid the decline in oil prices” [Assanbayev 2016: 127–138]. however, emerging 
barriers to the effective development of the Kashagan field have given rise of skep-
ticism. But, both the Kazakhstan’s government and Western companies are full of 
hope regarding development of Kashagan [Assanbayev 2016: 127–138]. The offs-
hore oil field was discovered in 2000 and is located 4,200 meters below the shallow 
waters of the northern part of the Caspian Sea in the Kazakh sector. Its reserves are 
estimated at 4.8 billion tons of oil. There are also large recoverable reserves of natural 
gas in Kashagan – more than 1 trillion cubic meters [Assanbayev 2016: 127–138]. 
“Low salinity, due to the in-flow of fresh water from the Volga River, combined 
with shallow waters and winter temperatures below minus 30 degrees mean that the 
northern part of the Caspian Sea freezes for nearly five months of the year. Ice drifts 
and ice scouring place heavy constraints on construction activities” [Assanbayev 
2016: 127–138]. This project is implemented by a consortium of Western oil giants: 
Italian Eni, US ExxonMobil Corp., Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell PLC, French 
Total, and Japan’s Inpex [Assanbayev 2016: 127–138]. Since 2013, it has involved 
Chinese CNPC, which entered into a consortium replacing ConocoPhillips. In 2000, 
the initial plans of Nurlan Balgimbayev, the then director of the government-owned 
company “Kazakh Oil” (predecessor of KazMunaiGas), stated that “commercial 
oil production was supposed to start in 2005” [Assanbayev 2016: 127–138]. It was 
assumed that during the first stage (2013–2017), production would reach 50 million 
tons per year. During the second phase (2018–2019), production was projected at 
75 million tons. The realization of these projects would put Kazakhstan among 
the top five oil exporters in the world, but the start of Kashagan oil production has 
been repeatedly postponed [Assanbayev 2016: 127–138]. On October 14, 2016, 
Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy announced that the Kashagan project had finally 
succeeded in shipping its first crude oil. According to the North Caspian Operating 
Company, Kashagan oil delivery will be transported in a primarily northern direc-
tion, first to the Russian city of Samara, and then onto Novorossiysk on the Black 
Sea, from where it will be exported.  The possible southwest export route is through 
the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline or be exported to international markets 
via other routes [Sorbello 2016]. It is also expected that oil from Kashagan will be 
exported to China. In 2013, CNPC bought an 8.3% stake in the Kashagan project, 
seeking for an increase in oil supplies from Kazakhstan to China. however, this is 
currently limited by the existing pipeline capacity to deliver the Kashagan oil to 
China [Assanbayev 2016: 127–138]. 
Despite its promising perspectives, the realization of the Kashagan project will 
constitute potentially large technological and environmental risks and challenges. The 
combination of ice, shallow waters, and sea level fluctuations creates considerable 
operational and technical problems [Assanbayev 2016: 127–138]. At the same time, 
we have to consider a number of important challenges in regard to oil production in 
Kashagan. At the end of 2013, oil prices on the world market fluctuated between an 
average of USD 100–110 per barrel, and in 2015 to USD 57.17 per barrel [Chervin-
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skyi 2015]. That is why, this project is quite risky from the economic point of view 
[Assanbayev 2016: 127–138].
Revenues from oil exports make up more than half of Kazakhstan’s budget, and 
its economy is heavily reliant on exporting crude oil. The geopolitics of transporta-
tion in Central Asia and the Caspian region is the primary concerns for Kazakhstan’s 
energy policy [Assanbayev 2016: 127–138]. Kazakhstan will work to achieve the 
diversification of hydrocarbon transportation routes to world markets and for ma-
ximizing the efficiency of the pipeline systems [Baizakova 2010: 103–109]. As the 
energy sector is still the backbone of the economy, Kazakhstan intends to increase its 
oil production and therefore the Kashagan oil field is a key priority in this context.
PIPELINE INFRASTRUCTURE
China’s energy geopolitics assumes significant increases in its role in implemen-
ting new energy and infrastructure projects in Central Asia. The role of China in the 
region increased during the last 10–15 years, considering the huge “energy shortage” 
for its rapidly developing economy [Penerliev 2012: 4]. A number of decisions of the 
Chinese politicians lead the state to closer relations with Central Asia [Penerliev 2012: 
4]. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), for example, is an economic and 
political alliance between China, Russia and the central Asian post-Soviet republics: 
Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan. The organization plays also 
a key geopolitical role for the energy and transport infrastructure [Penerliev 2012: 
4] (see: Map 2). The Central Asian states have been negotiating gas exports with 
China since 2006 [Fredholm 2011: 3]. Among them, Kazakhstan has the capacity to 
produce more oil and gas than it needs for domestic consumption [Fredholm 2011: 
3]. The realization of this cooperation started on December 14, 2009 with the longest 
functioning gas pipeline in the world, delivering gas from Turkmenistan through 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to China [Penerliev 2012: 4]. Its length is 1,833 km and 
it ends in Sindzan, in the Uigur region in China [Penerliev 2012: 4].
The region of Central Asia with its rich energy resources became one of the 
main directions for China to diversify its oil and natural gas supplies. Over the 
recent decades, China pursues more active policy in its relations with the countries 
of the region. This approach includes initiating new export routes [Nechaeva, Li 
2017]. Geography is one of China’s crucial advantages in strengthening its influence 
over the region. China is going to be “the next door neighbor” of the Caspian states 
[Demir 2010: 527]. 
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Map 2. Pipelines connecting Kazakhstan with China
Source: http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/china-russia-and-new-great-game-central-asia (access: 12.04.2017).
China pursued the “Pan-Asia Continental Oil Bridge” project in 1996. It was 
a network of oil and natural gas stretching from the Middle East, Central Asia, 
Russia and China [Cole 2003: 28]. China’s strategy towards Central Asia outlines 
a “Silk Road Economic Belt” that would open up the transportation channel from 
the Pacific to the Baltic Sea.
Sino-Kazakh relations can be regarded as a success in terms of energy policy 
of both states. “China’s intensive focus on expanding transport routes to its western 
border should be considered within the framework of China’s energy geopolitical 
tactics in Central Asia” [Assanbayev 2016: 127–138]. Kazakhstan and all Central 
Asia region seems the most likely to play an important role in the Chinese strategy 
to reduce its dependence on energy supplies from the Middle East [Assanbayev 
2016: 127–138]. 
The 2009 China–Central Asia oil and gas pipeline system is the best example 
of a recently completed infrastructure project [Assanbayev 2016: 127–138]. Gi-
ven that Beijing hopes to ensure energy supplies to the Chinese market [Assan-
bayev 2016: 127–138]. China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy signifies the 
importance of Kazakhstan and Central Asian partners in the development of the 
Chinese economy. “Geographical proximity and the availability of rich energy 
deposits in Central Asia provide China with cheap sources of energy” [Assan-
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bayev 2016: 127–138]. At the same time, China’s energy geopolitics should be 
considered within the context of security issues and economic development of its 
Western regions. That is why, there is a significant role for cooperation between 
China, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian states in the fight against extremism 
and ethnic separatism in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region [Assanbayev 
2016: 127–138].
China has already invested some USD 30 billion in the energy sector of Kazakh-
stan. Over the past few years, China has poured investments into Kazakhstan with 
the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline [Lin 2010: 9]. 
a) oil infrastructure
Kazakhstan, with its large hydrocarbon reserves is one of most important trade 
partners for China. Both states signed an agreement in 1997 that started Chinese 
investments in the Kazakh petroleum sector [Misiągiewicz, Ziętek 2008: 118]. Chi-
na National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) became the owner of 60% shares of 
Aktubinskmunaigaz, which controls the main oil fields in northwestern Kazakhstan: 
Zhanazhol and Kenkiyak [Misiągiewicz, Ziętek 2008: 118]. Moreover, CNPC pur-
chased shares in Uzen oil fields. China first proposed a pipeline infrastructure through 
Kazakhstan in 1996 [howell 2009: 195]. Both Russia and the United States opposed 
the pipeline. Russia wanted to be the only transit area for the Kazakh crude oil, and 
the US supported the trans-Caspian pipeline project to supply the European market 
[Misiągiewicz 2012: 203–222]. Nowadays, China is able to import a volume of 10 
to 20 million tons of crude oil from Kazakhstan each year. The Kazakhstan–China 
pipeline was built by a joint venture between CNPC and KazMunaiGas. The Ata-
su–Alashankou part of the project was initiated in 1997. In May 2002, CNPC and 
KazMunaiGas started to build the first 449 km part of the pipeline from Kenkiyak 
(central Kazakhstan) to Atyrau (at the Caspian Sea shore). In December 2005, cross
-border 962 km portion of the pipeline was completed [Demir 2010: 528]. In May 
2006, Kazakh oil was sent to China. Then, the pipeline carried about 200,000 barrels 
per day to China’s Dushanzi refinery [howell 2009: 195]. 
b) natural gas infrastructure
In June 2010, CNPC signed an agreement with KazMunaiGas to build the second 
phase of the Kazakhstan–China Gas Pipeline in a bid to tap Kazakh gas reserves 
[Lin 2010: 9]. This transit route is part of a larger project to build pipelines connec-
ting China with Central Asia’s natural gas reserves. It stretches from Turkmenistan, 
through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and enters China’s northwestern Xinjiang 
region. Commercial gas volumes were sent across the Kazakh-Chinese border in 
October 2017, CNPC said on Reuters [China’s CNPC imports… 2017]. It is a part 
of a deal under which Kazakhstan has agreed to send 5 billion cubic meters of gas 
to China over one year. This project is a part of China’s attempts to secure more 
energy sources worldwide. This is also an element of China’s overall Silk Road 
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strategy (OBOR) to diversify energy dependence on the unstable Gulf region and 
build overland routes to hedge against maritime supply disruptions.2
CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper was to verify two main hypothesis. The first one: “The ener-
gy security is vital to economic development both for the People’s Republic of China 
and Kazakhstan”. The second one, was: “China, as a rapidly expanding economy, 
and the largest energy consumer in the world, has given Kazakhstan increasing 
economic importance. China’s interests in Kazakhstan as a Caspian littoral state are 
part of its overall Silk Road strategy to diversify energy dependence on the unstable 
Gulf region and build overland routes to hedge against maritime supply disruptions 
from the Gulf”.
China’s economic rise has caught the world by surprise, partly because of its scale 
and speed [Misiągiewicz, Misiągiewicz 2016: 33–42]. Its extraordinary economic 
growth caused the increase in energy consumption. That is why, energy security, 
and the availability of oil and natural gas in particular, has become an increasingly 
important concern for this state. Thereby, China has assigned geopolitical attention to 
Kazakhstan, looking for ways to build pipeline infrastructure to export hydrocarbon 
reserves eastwards [Labban 2009: 42]. The idea of  the “One Belt, One Road” is 
an important concept in this process. It will promote the China as a soft power and 
attractive player in the global market (also the energy market). Silk Road Economic 
Belt connects China and Europe via Kazakhstan and Russia. It would serve this 
purpose for China’s western and inland central Asian states [Wacker 2014]. As regar-
ds Kazakhstan, energy production is crucial for the state’s economic development, 
which relies heavily on the growing energy exports. With regard to the crucial role 
of the energy sector in Kazakhstan’s economic development, the state is determined 
to develop this potential by improving cooperation with the main energy importers 
in the region. That is why, transport diversification issues are particularly sensitive 
for Kazakhstan. In such circumstances, the energy security interests of China and 
Kazakhstan are comprehensive, and the cooperation between them is the natural 
phenomenon in the contemporary international energy market. 
2  An estimated 85% of China’s imports and between 70–85% of its energy supplies, mainly from the 
Middle East, are sea-borne and pass through several maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca 
in the South China Sea which continue to be secured by the USA.
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